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Abstract 
Strong consolidation is one of the most evident developments of banking markets around the world 
in recent decades. This change is raising questions on how and to what an extent competition is 
affected by the expansion of the largest banks. The aim of the present study is to measure the degree 
of competition in the Portuguese commercial banking market in the long-run, during the period 
ranging from1960 to 2013, by using the non-structural model developed by Panzar and Rosse.   
The main findings are that the Portuguese banking system, despite the legal restrictions in place, 
operated mostly in a market with some degree of competition and, at some points in time, presented 
some interesting competitive features. More recently, it has evolved into functioning as a cartel. 
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Introduction 
The last thirty years saw an unprecedented process of liberalisation and deregulation in the European 
banking industry. But one of the most prominent developments has been the change in market 
structure as a result of strong consolidation. This has been characterised by a sharp fall in the number 
of banks, increased concentration, and the grown size of the largest banks. 
Portugal has not been an exception. After a long period of tight rules designed to hinder competition, 
the Portuguese banking system has finally undergone a period of liberalisation. However, the 
Portuguese banking system is a unique case in Europe for two main reasons: because it evolved 
from being Government-owned to market-driven, and because this change has been accompanied 
by severe institutional shocks. These institutional shocks caused three obvious divisions in the period 
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under analysis: from 1960 to 1975, a period that, according to the literature, is expected to have had 
some degree of competition; from 1975 to the  mid-1980s, corresponding to the nationalised 
banking system period, in which no significant competition in the market is expected; and the last 
period, from mid-1980s to 2013, when a high degree of competition in the market is expected, as it 
corresponds to the liberalisation period.  The latest period has also seen a significant decrease in the 
number of banks, especially at the beginning of the twenty-first century, as a result of an intensive 
activity of mergers and acquisitions. How has competition evolved during these different periods? 
Are the institutional shocks a reason for the changes on the competitive environment or have they 
had no impact on competition? Is the increase in concentration a sign of a decrease in competition?  
The purpose of the present study is to measure the degree of competition in the Portuguese banking 
market in the period from 1960 until 2013 by using a common method – the Panzar-Rosse (P-R) 
model. This model has many advantages when compared with the traditional structure-conduct-
performance (SCP) measures of concentration, such as the Herfindahl-Hirschman index and the 𝑘 
Bank Concentration Ratios.  The Panzar-Rosse model is the most suitable model in this case 
because it uses bank-level data; has relatively low data requirements, which is an advantage when 
data constraints are a problem, especially in long-term studies; and is easy to estimate by means of 
regression. An additional advantage is that it is relatively easy to replicate in other cases, something 
that is important for international comparisons. 
This paper intends to be a contribution to the literature on Portuguese banking competition by 
covering a long-term period and by providing evidence on how competition has evolved during 
these years according to different types of regulation. It constitutes a guide for decision-makers, 
regulators and Government authorities, and is an innovative contribution to the general debate on 
competitive issues not only in Portugal but also in other countries. Several authors applied the P-R 
approach to study the competitive environment in the banking sector but only a few studies are 
available for the Portuguese banking system. The studies developed by Amaral (2015) and 
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Boucinha and Ribeiro (2009) have contributed to the literature on Portuguese banking competition 
but did not cover such an extensive period. Amaral (2015) focused on the analysis of commercial 
banks between 1960 and 1973 and found evidence of monopolistic competition in the market 
without excluding perfect competition. Boucinha and Ribeiro (2009) studied the competitive 
environment of the largest Portuguese banking groups in the 1991-2004 period and also arrived at 
the same conclusions. Due to the size of the time period under scrutiny, it is only possible to focus on 
the commercial banking activity. Conscious of the implications that it can bring to the final 
interpretation of the results, especially in the 1990s when dozens of new and specialized institutions 
started to arise, the current paper finishes with a note for a further and a more complete investigation 
on the topic. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section I presents the literature review on the 
main features of Portuguese banking legislation between 1960 and 2013, with special attention to the 
degree of concentration in the market. Section II presents the empirical methodology employed and 
data. Results are shown in section III and section IV concludes. 
I. Literature on Portuguese Banking Regulation 
The Portuguese banking system constitutes an interesting case to analyse because it has experienced 
remarkable transformations in the past fifty years and because it was given an almost complete fresh 
start during the 1990s and the early twenty-first century. This was the result of a vast privatisation 
process that took place in that period and which, in turn, was the result of a nationalisation period, 
starting in the mid-1970s. Consequently, the Portuguese banking system was subject to two great 
institutional shocks: nationalisation, first, and privatisation afterwards. Therefore, it is possible to 
divide the period under analysis into three obvious sub-periods with different implications for the 
Portuguese banking system.  
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At the beginning of the first sub-period, from 1960 until the mid-1970s, there were twenty-two 
commercial banks operating in Portugal, without taking into account Caixa Geral de Depósitos, 
which was a bank of the state (Valério, 2010). The banking sector was very heavily regulated and 
the central legal piece was Decree-Law 42461 of 12
th
 November 1959. As can be seen from Table I, 
and according to this institutional setting, banks had a very limited freedom to act (Amaral, 2013). 
Despite the legal boundaries in place, Amaral (2013) defends that Portuguese commercial banks 
found various ways to circumvent the law and to compete with each other through the growth of 
time deposits and geographical expansion. The value of the Hirschman-Herfindahl Index (HHI), a 
measure of market concentration, for assets and deposits in the Portuguese commercial banking 
market in 1960 was 14% and 15%, respectively (Figure I). The meaning of this value in terms of 
market concentration has no direct interpretation but the guidelines of the US Department of Justice 
(2010) created a benchmark, defending that an HHI between 15% and 25% corresponds to a 
moderately concentrated market. The degree of concentration fell in 1973 to 9% in the case of assets 
and to10% in the case of deposits, representing the lower value of concentration in the Portuguese 
banking market. 
The second sub-period, from the mid-1970s until the mid-1980s, is marked by the nationalisation 
process previously referred, in the sequence of a revolution that took place in 1974. The most radical 
transformation of this process occurred in 14
th
 March 1975 when Decree-Law 132-A/75 ordered the 
nationalisation of all credit institutions based in Portugal
1
. The constitutional rule of irreversibility of 
nationalisation and of prohibiting the formation of private credit institutions by Law 46/77 of 8
th
 July, 
also known as Law of Delimitation of the Public and Private Sectors, has maintained during the 
following years the majority of the Portuguese banking system under the direct control of the state. 
Entry in the market was also banned by the 1976 Constitution which prohibited the private 
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 Exceptions: three branches of foreign commercial banks – Banco do Brasil, Bank of London & South America and 





, as shown in Table I. In principle, these institutional factors should lead to a 
situation of almost no competition in the market, an opinion defended by Pinho (2000). 
In the third sub-period, starting in mid-1980s, the system was opened to private property, and 
barriers to entry were gradually dismantled, culminating in a complete integration into the fully 
liberalised European Internal Market in 1993. The Law 11/83 of 16
th
 August 1983 granted the 
Government legislative authorisation to review the Law of Delimitation of the Public and Private 
Sectors, in order to end with the restriction of private initiative. The formation of private commercial 
banks was governed by Decree-Law 51/84 of 11
th
 February, presented in detail in Table I. However, 
the privatisation process was only formalised with the 1989 constitutional revision, which ended 
with the irreversibility of the 1975 nationalisations, and allowed for the reprivatisation of banks that 
were previously nationalised (Valério, 2010). This period was also accompanied by the entry of new 
private banks in the market, as referred in Table II. After the privatisation process, two banking 
institutions remained under state control: Caixa Geral de Depósitos and Banco Nacional 
Ultramarino. 
The current sub-period is described by Pinho (2000), who studied the evolution of market power and 
non-price competition during the deregulation process, as a period of increased competition. 
Because of the interest rate restrictions still in place, the new banks opted to use non-price 
instruments to gain market share. Consequently, branching expansion became the main source of 
competition and advertising expenditures turned out to be increasingly important, something that did 
not happen in former periods. Barros and Modesto (1999) present a similar view by defending that 
there was strong competition for market share based on services quality and creation of new 
products, which was only intensified by the price competition initiated after liberalisation of the 
interest rates, occurred in the mid-1990s. With its entry into the EC, Portugal undertook a series of 
                                                          
2 Article 83rd, from the 1976 Constitution, states that all nationalizations that took place after the 25th April 1974 
revolution are irreversible conquests of the working class (Valério, 2010). 
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liberalisation policies as a result of the new political commitment towards the creation of an 
economic system free from all remaining controls. Therefore, in the mid-1990s banks started to 
carry out their business in a full market environment where interest rate setting was free and credit 
ceilings
3
, a system of credit quotas that was in effect during the 1980s, were eliminated (Boucinha 
and Ribeiro, 2009).  
Despite the legislative drive towards the integration of banking markets, Mexia and Leite (1991) 
defend that important barriers to entry remained in effect in Portugal as the minimum capital 
requirements were very high and the opening of new branches as well as entry in the market were 
still dependent on the Government’s authorisation. Therefore, the authors argue that the banking 
sector has undergone an ambiguous process of liberalisation. On the one hand, private banks were 
allowed to operate in Portugal, and the elimination of credit ceilings and other constraints have 
created a more competitive market. On the other hand, banking authorities delayed the 
implementation of a complete liberalisation process through the maintenance of discretionary 
barriers to entry, mainly at a national level, which has allowed the persistence of monopolistic 
behaviour, limiting the extent of the price effects of liberalisation.  
The evolution of concentration in the Portuguese banking market according to the HHI shows that 
concentration has increased over the deregulation period as it was followed by a consolidation trend 
across the market. Despite the entry of new banks, in the 1990s there was an intense activity of 
mergers and acquisitions. Consequently, at the beginning of the twenty-first century there were only 
six commercial banks operating in Portugal, with the three largest banks dominating the majority of 
the market. Figures I and II show an exponential increase in concentration at the beginning of the 
twenty-first century, which is consistent with the mergers and acquisitions represented in Table II. 
                                                          
3
 According to Mexia and Leite (1991), credit ceilings were a form to finance government’s deficit by forcing banks 
to maintain a high proportion of their assets on idle applications.  
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The HHI for assets and deposits reached the higher value in 2003 (23% for assets and 24% for 
deposits). 
Although often used, the measures of concentration referred above cannot be used as the only 
confirmation of the existence or lack of competition, but they constitute an important preliminary 
indicator to take into account. In order to evaluate how the competitive position of the Portuguese 
banking market has evolved, the Panzar-Rosse test will be performed. The next sections discuss the 
empirical specification of the model and main results.  
II. The Panzar and Rosse Model – Empirical Methodology and Data 
In this section the theory underlying the Panzar-Rosse approach is explained only briefly. A more 
detailed explanation is provided in articles by Rosse and Panzar (1977), Panzar and Rosse (1987), 
Bikker and Groeneveld (2000) or Bikker and Haaf (2002).   
Rosse and Panzar (1977) and Panzar and Rosse (1987) developed a test based on properties of a 
reduced-form revenue equation at the firm level and use a test statistic 𝐻, which can be seen as a 
measure of competitive behaviour of banks under certain assumptions
4
.  
The first assumption is that firms in a certain market operate in long-run equilibrium. Any firm is 
described by a production function, in which its outputs are 𝑦𝑖, and 𝑦𝑖 = 𝑓(𝑥1, … , 𝑥𝑛) where 𝑥𝑖 
are 𝑛 inputs. To the last function corresponds a revenue function 𝑅(𝑦𝑖, 𝑧𝑖), where 𝑧𝑖 is a vector of 
exogenous variables that affects the firm’s revenues, and a cost function 𝐶(𝑦𝑖, 𝑤𝑖, 𝑡𝑖), where 𝑤𝑖 are 
the input prices and 𝑡𝑖 is a vector of exogenous variables affecting the firm’s costs. Thus, the firm’s 
profits can be written as 𝜋 = 𝑅 − 𝐶 = 𝑅(𝑦𝑖, 𝑧𝑖) − 𝐶(𝑦𝑖, 𝑤𝑖, 𝑡𝑖). The second assumption is that 
firm 𝑖 maximises its profits, where marginal revenue equals marginal cost. At the market level, it 
means that, in equilibrium, the zero profit constraint holds:  
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 The extension of the Panzar-Rosse methodology to banking requires assuming that banks are treated as product 
firms, which is consistent with the so-called intermediation approach to banking where banks are viewed mainly as 
financial intermediaries (De Bandt and Davis, 2000). 
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(I) 
Variables marked with an asterisk (∗) represent marginal values. The type of behaviour in the 
market is measured by the extent to which a change in input prices 𝑑𝑤𝑖 is reflected in the 
equilibrium revenues earned by bank 𝑖 (𝑑𝑅𝑖
∗). In words, this asks the question: What will be the 
percentage change in equilibrium revenue resulting from a 1% change in all input prices of bank 𝑖? 
More specifically, Rosse and Panzar (1977) and Panzar and Rosse (1987) define a measure of 
competition, corresponding to the sum of the elasticity of the reduce-form revenues with respect to 
the input prices: 
 
(II) 
Panzar and Rosse (1987) proved that an increase in input prices will increase marginal costs, 
affecting revenue and output negatively. In order to accommodate the loss of revenue the 
monopolist simply reduces output and increases its price. In the case of perfect competition and 
under certain conditions, an increase in input prices raises both marginal and average costs without 
changing the optimal output of any firm. Exit of some firms from the market increases the demand 
faced by each of the surviving ones, which leads to an increase in prices and revenues equivalent to 
the increase in costs. In the case of oligopoly, an intermediate behaviour results. Therefore, 
according to Panzar and Rosse (1987), an 𝐻 that is 0 or negative (𝐻 ≤ 0) corresponds to a 
monopoly or a perfectly colluding oligopoly, an 𝐻 that is 1 (𝐻 = 1) corresponds to perfect 
competition, and an 𝐻 between 0 and 1 (0 < 𝐻 < 1) corresponds to monopolistic competition, 
which is a form of oligopoly having competitive features similar to perfect competition in the long-
run. In the empirical analysis, the following specification of the model was set up: 
(III) 































Where 𝛼 is a constant term, 𝜂𝑖 is an unobserved variable which captures idiosyncratic features of 
each bank that are constant over time and 𝜀𝑖𝑡 is an error term. The subscript 𝑖 denotes bank 𝑖 and the 
subscript 𝑡 denotes year 𝑡. Equation (III) is similar to what is commonly used in the literature but the 
choice of dependent and independent variables is reliant on data availability. The dependent variable 
is the natural logarithm of interest revenue divided by total assets (𝐼𝑅/𝐴). As the bank’s accounts 
did not separate interest from commissions in many years, this variable includes the two items 
together as an approximation to the true variable. In order to increase the range of the approach, the 
same tests were performed using total revenue divided by total assets as the dependent variable. 
Total revenue includes not only revenue coming from interest and commissions, but also from other 
sources, such as the return on stock, return on foreign exchange operations, and some other types of 
operations. However, the choice of the dependent variable raises some issues. According to Bikker, 
Spierdijk and Finnie (2007) and Bikker, Shaffer and Spierdijk (2010), the use of revenues divided by 
total assets (scaled dependent variable) will change the nature of the model, since it transforms the 
revenue equation into a price equation, distorting the measurement of competition in favour of high 
values of 𝐻 and, thus, perfect competition. Most versions of the Panzar-Rosse test use the 
specification presented above, in which the dependent variable is scaled by total assets. Using the 
specification proposed by Bikker, Spierdijk and Finnie (2007) and Bikker, Shaffer and Spierdijk 
(2010) will mean to ignore several previous banking studies that apply the Panzar-Rosse test such as 
Nathan and Neave (1989), De Bandt and Davis (2000) and Claessens and Laeven (2004). Since 
economic theory does not give clear guidance as to which modelling approach best describes the 
behaviour of the banking firm, the four specifications presented in the literature will be estimated.  
As referred above, the Panzar and Rosse methodology follows an intermediation approach which 
means that banks are modelled as firms that use labour, physical capital and funds to produce loans. 
Thus, for the independent variables, we have first the input prices that are presented as proxies. The 
price of personnel expenses (𝑤𝐿) was proxied using the ratio of total wage expenditure to total 
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assets. The ratio of annual personnel expenses to the number of fulltime employees would be a 
better measure (Bikker, Spierdijk and Finnie, 2007) but due to the lack of data regarding the 
employee numbers, the total assets configuration was used instead. The price of capital (𝑤𝑘) was 
proxied by the ratio of bank’s capital expenditures to fixed assets. As there is no straight information 
on the capital expenditures, this variable was proxied by the banks’ expenditures excluding interest 
and wages to fixed assets. The average funding cost (𝑤𝐹) was proxied using the ratio of interest 
paid to interest bearing debt. The Panzar and Rosse’s H-statistic is equal to the sum of the 
coefficients of the three input prices (𝛽1 + 𝛽2 + 𝛽3). 
Besides input prices, most studies include a wide range of explanatory variables to account for 
differences between banks in terms of cost, risk and structure. The ratio of demand deposits to total 
debt (𝐷𝐷/𝑇𝐷) captures features of the funding mix. The credit risk is measured by the ratio of 
loans to total assets (𝐿/𝐴) and the credit mix by the ratio of interbank deposits to loans (𝐼𝐵/𝐿).  In 
order to capture the banks’ activities beyond financial intermediation, the ratio of off-balance sheet 
activity to total assets (𝑂𝐵𝑆/𝐴) was included. Branching strategy is defined as the ratio of total 
assets to total branches (𝐴/𝐵) and intends to capture systematic differences in branch density. The 
capital-assets ratio (𝐸/𝐴), or leverage, is used as a measure of risk across banks. The ratio of other 
revenue to interest revenue (𝑂𝑅/𝐼𝑅) was also included in the model to account for changes in 
income structure.  The problem of separation between interest and commissions repeats again and, 
hence, this variable corresponds to the difference between income from interest and commissions 
lumped together and other types of income that are reported in the banks’ accounts.  
To implement the above methodology, data were extracted from the bank’s annual reports, listed on 
the bibliography. However, Banco da Madeira, Banco Ferreira Alves e Pinto Leite, Banco 
Fonsecas, Santos e Viana, Banco Regional de Aveiro and Banco Aliança were excluded due to lack 
of indicators on the accounts of these banks to set up the model. Other banks that had only one year 
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of observations, such as Banco José Henriques Totta, were also removed from the sample. The data 
from individual accounts were used instead of data from consolidated accounts since consolidated 
accounting data is available only in the most recent period. The dataset used in this study has not 
been adjusted for bank mergers, i.e. two merging banks are treated as two separate banks until the 
year of merger from where on only the “take over” bank is accounted for (Hempell, 2002).  
All money variables were translated to euros at the 1999 irrevocable exchange rate and deflated 
using a GDP deflator with 2011 as the base year. Finally, we arrive at an unbalanced panel of yearly 
data with 628 observations. An OLS regression with fixed-effects was used to estimate the model 
that takes into account different specifications of the dependent variable to accommodate for doubts 
concerning the suitable variables, as discussed below. Descriptive statistics are presented in Table III.  
III. Results  
Table IV presents the results for the different specifications employed. In each specification of the 
model are shown results for tests where the estimation of the variance-covariance matrix of the error 
is not robust to heteroscedasticity. Tests where the variance-covariance matrix of the error is robust 
to heteroscedasticity were performed but produced no difference in the results. Therefore, for 
reasons of space we present only the first set of results in Table IV. The interpretation of the P-R 
approach depends on whether or not banks are in long-run equilibrium. Consequently, the P-R 
equation was estimated using Return on Assets (ROA) as the dependent variable and a test for 
𝐻 = 0 (equilibrium) against 𝐻 < 0 (disequilibrium) was performed, where 𝐻 is the sum of factor 
price elasticities with respect to profitability measures. As shown in column (1), the null hypothesis 
was not rejected, so that it is possible to assume long-run equilibrium in the market. As for the actual 
competition test, monopoly or perfectly colluding oligopoly was tested using a one-sided test in 
which the null hypothesis was 𝐻 ≤ 0 and the alternative hypothesis was 𝐻 > 0. Perfect 
competition was tested using a two-sided test, where the null hypothesis was 𝐻 = 1 versus 𝐻 ≠ 1. 
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Column (2) reports the results for the specification in which the interest revenue is scaled by total 
assets (𝐼𝑅/𝐴).  The H-statistic is 0.896. In this specification, the null hypothesis of monopoly or 
perfectly colluding oligopoly was clearly rejected, meaning that the Portuguese commercial banking 
system between 1960 and 2013 did not function as a monopoly or a perfectly colluding oligopoly. 
The null hypothesis for perfect competition was also rejected. The conclusion is that the Portuguese 
banking market functioned under monopolistic competition. The same procedures were followed in 
the results presented in column (3) but for a specification in which the dependent variable is total 
revenue, still scaled by total assets (𝑇𝑅/𝐴). The H-statistic is now 0.877, but the test produced the 
same results as with (𝐼𝑅/𝐴). Looking at coefficients, input prices are generally significant in both 
specifications, with the exception of the price of capital. This may be the result of the proxy used to 
construct the variable. Results for the control variables are also significant, except for the credit mix 
(𝐼𝐵 𝐿⁄ ), which is not significant in both specifications.  
Columns (4) and (5) show the results on non-scaled dependent variables. The H-statistic is 0.929 in 
the case of interest revenue and 0.909 in the case of total revenue. The same tests as above were 
performed and the null hypothesis of monopoly or perfectly colluding oligopoly was again clearly 
rejected, confirming the results of the first tests. But the same did not happen with the null hypothesis 
of perfect competition, as in both specifications it was not rejected. With non-scaled variables the 
price of capital and the average funding cost are not significant. Credit risk (𝐿 𝐴⁄ ) is not significant, 
which means that this variable was irrelevant in the specification in which the dependent variables 
are not scaled by total assets. Results on the variable corresponding to other income to interest 
income (𝑂𝑅 𝐼𝑅⁄ ) are not significant in the case in which the dependent variable is the interest 
revenue, meaning that is not possible to decide what the true effect of this variable was.  
The tests provide a different message but all lead in the direction of refusing lack of competition in 
the market throughout the entire period. The uncertainty resides in which specification is more 
appropriate. The difference between the two types of specification (scaled and non-scaled) is 
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interesting because the results that are favourable to perfect competition occur in the cases where the 
dependent variables should have biased the result to a smaller degree of competition. However, this 
is, of course, too long a period so we need to investigate the behaviour of the market in the three sub-
periods defined above: 1960-1975, 1975-1989 and 1989-2013. This division allows for an 
assessment of the institutional shocks over the competitive behaviour of banks. 
Table V presents the various tests that were done. In the case of the specification with interest 
revenue scaled by total assets, both the null hypothesis for monopoly and for perfect competition 
were rejected in the 1960-1975 period, meaning that during these years the Portuguese banking 
market functioned under monopolistic competition, as defended by Amaral (2015). The results for 
the followings periods, from 1975 to 1989 and from 1989 to 2013, displayed the same results. As it 
was seen in section II, the concentration in the market increased exponentially at the beginning of the 
twenty-first century. In order to see if competition has maintained the same path in the last two 
decades or if the increase in concentration has had some impact on competition, tests on the periods 
from 1989 to 2000 and from 2000 to 2013 were performed. In the period from 1989-2000, it was 
not possible to reject the null hypothesis for perfect competition, and in the period from 2000-2013 it 
was not possible to reject the null hypothesis for monopoly or perfectly colluding oligopoly. This 
shows that competition did increase after reprivatisation but that it evolved into the other extreme, by 
presenting a perfectly colluding oligopoly situation after 2000, so the intensive concentration in the 
Portuguese banking market, as can be seen in Figures I and II, did result in lack of competition. The 
results for total revenue scaled by total assets (rows 6 to 10) provide the same conclusions. 
When the specification in which the dependent variables are not scaled, the results are slightly 
different but still convey a similar message. In the case of interest revenue it is not possible to reject 
perfect competition for the 1960-1975 years. The same happens again with the 1975-1989 period, 
which is surprising since banks were under the state ownership. The main difference from the 
previous specification relies on the fact that from 1989 to 2013 the Portuguese banking market was 
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operating under a perfectly colluding oligopoly. In order to see if the type of competition was the 
same throughout the entire length of the last period, the same kind of tests as above were performed. 
It was found that from 1990 to 1997 the market operated under perfect competition but from 1997 
until 2013 it became a colluding oligopoly market. When the dependent variable is total revenue, the 
results are identical, as shown in rows 16 to 20.  
Table VI summarizes the main studies that are about Portugal or that include Portugal in their 
sample. The comparison is interesting as most of the studies suggest that there is some degree of 
competition in the Portuguese banking market, with the exception of the work developed by Bikker 
et al. (2007) which shows that in the 1988-2004 period, with a scaled dependent variable, the 
Portuguese banking market functioned as a perfectly colluding oligopoly. Table VII displays the 
results for different countries, revealing that the Portuguese commercial banking system had features 
of competition that were similar around the world. 
As the periods are shortened and the number of observations declines, these tests are less reliable 
than those including the full sample, but they still provide a consistent message, namely that at some 
point at the beginning of 2000 there was a change in the direction of decreased competition in the 
Portuguese commercial banking market. One possibility is related to greater activity of mergers and 
acquisitions. Table I does indeed show that such type of episodes increased from the 1990s onwards 
and became particularly sizeable at the beginning of twenty-first century. This led to a reduction in 
the number of commercial banks operating in Portugal. 
IV. Conclusion 
In this paper a statistical approach of the Panzar-Rosse model was used in order to assess the degree 
of competition in the Portuguese commercial banking market in the period ranging from 1960 to 
2013. The results obtained demonstrate that the Portuguese commercial banking market showed a 
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reasonable degree of competition when the whole period is considered. Some tests point to 
monopolistic competition, others to perfect competition, dependent on the type of specification used.   
When the whole period is divided into smaller sub-periods the message is refined. Even if they are 
less powerful and reliable, due to the reduction in the number of observations, the tests on shorter 
periods point to some degree of competition until mid-1990’s, approximately, with the 1990s decade 
presenting a higher level of competition in all specifications of the model. This conclusion raises 
some questions, namely, why a system so heavily regulated was able to generate a high degree of 
competition. This question reinforces Amaral’s (2013) view that some degree of contestability may 
have existed in the Portuguese banking market. Other interesting issue is that the period 
corresponding to the nationalised banking system was also characterised by some degree of 
competition. One possible explanation is the fact that, even under the state ownership, banks had 
some autonomy and were able to compete through other means, such as the geographic expansion 
or the growth of total deposits. However, this is an issue that requires further investigation.  
Regardless of the choice of the appropriate specification, one result is clear: the market functioned as 
a collusive cartel from the beginning of the twenty-first century onwards, as a result of an intensive 
concentration activity, which led to a reduction in the number of commercial banks to six at the 
beginning of the century. However, in this study it was only possible to consider the commercial 
banking sector. We cannot forget that during the 1990s there were dozens of other specialised 
institutions that started to arise, also providing financial services, which have been changing the 
sector. These new and specialised institutions were not considered due to the length of the study. But 
this is a line of research that should be followed in the future.  
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Figure I – Market Concentration in Portuguese Commercial Banking (Hirschman-
Herfindahl Index, Assets and Deposits), 1960-2013, (%) 
 
Sources: author’s calculations based on: Banco Agrícola e Industrial Visiense (1960-1976), Banco da Agricultura (1960-1977), 
Banco do Alentejo (1960-1976), Banco do Algarve (1960-1976), Banco Aliança (1960), Banco de Angola (1960-1976), Banco 
Borges & Irmão (1960-1995), Banco Burnay (1960-1966), Banco Comercial dos Açores (1979-2002), Banco Comercial Português 
(1986,2013), Banco Comércio & Indústria (1986-1994), Banco Espírito Santo & Comercial de Lisboa (1960-2013), Banco 
Fernandes de Magalhães (1960-1976), Banco Ferreira Alves & Pinto Leite (1960-1963), Banco Fonsecas, Santos e Viana (1960-
1966), Banco Fonsecas & Burnay (1967-1994), Banco Intercontinental Português (1972-1974), Banco Internacional do Funchal 
(1988-2013), Banco José Henriques Totta (1960), Banco Lisboa & Açores (1960-1969), Banco da Madeira (1960-1965), Banco 
Mello (1991-1998), Banco Micaelense (1960-1978), Banco Nacional Ultramarino (1960-2000), Banco Pinto de Magalhães (1972-
1976), Banco Pinto & Sotto Mayor (1960-1998), Banco Português do Atlântico (1960- 1998), Banco Português de Investimento 
(1998-2013), Banco Português de Negócios (1993-1998), Banco Raposo de Magalhães (1960-1964), Banco Regional de Aveiro 
(1960-1966), Banco Santander Totta (2002-2013), Banco Totta-Aliança (1961-1969), Banco Totta & Açores (1970- 2001), Caixa 
Geral de Depósitos (1960-2013), Companhia Geral do Crédito Predial Português (1960-1999), União de Bancos Portugueses (1978-
1995). 
Figure II – Concentration Ratios in Portuguese Commercial Banking (Assets and 




CR3: Assets/Deposits of the three largest banks in the market; CR5: Assets/Deposits of the five largest banks in the market.  




































































































































































































































































42,641, 12th  
November 
1959 
For a bank to settle in 
Lisbon or Porto, the 
minimum capital is 50 
million escudos. Outside 
Lisbon and Porto, the 
minimum capital is 20 
million escudos. For banks 
already functioning in 
Lisbon and Porto, the 
minimum capital is 30 
million escudos and 10 
million escudos for those 
outside the two cities. 
(Article 48th) 
Interest on demand 
deposits: 50% of the Banco 
de Portugal’s rediscount 
rate. 
 Interest on loans: not more 
than 1.5% above that same 
rediscount rate. 
No limits on time deposits. 
(Article 23rd) 
 
Cash Reserves: Equal 
to at least 15% of 
demand deposits and 
of time deposits of 
less than one month 
(Article 57th); and 5% 
of time deposits of 
more than one month 
(Article 58th). 
Legal Reserve Fund: 
Cannot exceed 10% 
of net profits (Article 
72nd). 
Forbidden to grant credit 
above 10% of the bank’s 
capital plus the reserve 
fund to one single firm or 
individual. This limit is 
raised to 30% if the 
collateral was constituted 
of public bonds; and to 
20% if it had the form of 
bank guarantees. (Article 
65th) 
Forbidden to acquire 
stock of other firm in 
more than the reserve 
fund plus 20% of the 
capital of the bank; 
and could not exceed 
20% of the capital of 
the firm. (Article 67th) 
Dependent on the 
authorisation by the 
Minister of Finance. 
(Article 6th) 
Dependent on the 
authorisation by the 
Minister of Finance. 
(Article 9th) 
Opening dependent 
on the authorisation 





46,492, 18th  
August 1965 
 For the first time limits on 
rates for time deposits: 
0.5% for demand deposits; 
1.25% for time deposits of 
less than one month; 2.5% 
for time deposits between 
30 days and 90 days; 3.5% 
for deposits between 90 
days and one year. (Article 
8th) 








No change in 
relation to Decree-
Law 42,641, 12th 
November 1959. 
Decree-Law 
47,912, 7th  
September 
1967 
 The Minister of Finance 
may, after consulting 
Banco de Portugal, set up, 
the interest rates of credit 
institutions, by ordinance 
(Article 1st) 








No change in 
relation to Decree-
Law 42,641, 12th 
November 1959. 
Decree-Law 
218/74, 27th  
May 1974 
 0.5% for deposits with 
maturities of over one 
hundred and eighty days 
(Article 3rd). 








No change in 
relation to Decree-




362/80, 9th  
September 
1980 
   Forbidden to grant credit 
above 10% of the bank’s 
capital plus reserve fund 
and above 1% of deposits 
in national currency to one 
single firm or individual. 
The Minister of Finance 
may, by ordinance, set up 
new limits (Article 1st) 
 The Constitution 






No change in 
relation to Decree-































51/84, 11th  
February 
1984 
Commercial banks must 
have a minimum capital of 
1,5 millions of contos 
(Article 25th). 
 The legal reserve 
fund must correspond 
to a fraction not 
exceeding 10% of net 
profits (Article 27th). 
 Forbidden to acquire 
stock of other firm in 
more than 20% of the 
capital (Article 26th). 
Dependent on the 
authorisation by the 
Prime Minister and  
Minister of Finance, 
after consulting Banco 
de Portugal (Article 
3rd) 
Dependent on the 
authorisation by 
Banco de Portugal 
and Minister of 
Finance (Article 
18th). 
Dependent on the 
authorisation by 
Banco de Portugal 




161/88, 13th  
May 1988 
 Assigns to banks the power 
to set up freely the price of 
their own services. 
   No change in relation 
to Decree-Law 51/84, 
11th February1984. 
No change in 
relation to Decree-
Law 51/84, 11th 
February 1984. 
No change in 
relation to Decree-




298/92, 31st  
December 
1992 
The Minister of Finance is 
responsible to set up the 
minimum capital 
requirements for credit 
institutions, by ordinance 
(Article 95th). Banco de 
Portugal determines the 
elements that integrate the 
funds of credit institutions, 
which cannot fall below 
the minimum capital 
(Article 96th). 
 The legal reserve 
fund must correspond 
to a fraction not 
exceeding 10% of net 
profits (Article 97th). 
Forbidden to grant credit 
above 0.5% of the bank’s 
capital to one single 
individual, without 
obtaining adequate 
information on their 
financial and economic 
situation (Article 98th). The 
amount of loans granted to 
qualifying holdings holders 
cannot exceed 10% of 
bank’s own funds (Article 
109th). 
Forbidden to acquire 
stock of more than 
15% of the own funds 
of the subsidiary 
(Article 100th). 
Forbidden to acquire 
stock of other firm in 
more than 25% of the 
voting rights 
corresponding to the 
capital of the 
subsidiary (Article 
101st).  
Dependent on the 
authorisation of Banco 
de Portugal. The 
authorisation must be 
communicated to the 
European Commission 
(Article 16th). 
Dependent on the 
authorisation by 
Banco de Portugal 
(Article 35th). 
Dependent on the 
authorisation by the 
Minister Finance 









The Minister of Finance is 
responsible, after 
consulting Banco de 
Portugal, to set up the 
minimum capital 
requirements for credit 
institutions, by ordinance 
(Article 95th). 
 The legal reserve 
fund must correspond 
to a fraction not 
exceeding 10% of 
profits, up to a limit 
equal to the value of 
the share capital or 
up to the sum of the 
reserves and retained 
earnings. (Article 
97th). 
 No change in relation 
to Decree 298/92, 31st 
December 1992. The 
acquisition of shares 
which exceed 10% of 
the capital of the 
investee or more than 
2% of the capital of 
the investor, must be 
reported to Banco de 
Portugal (Article 43rd- 
A). 
No change in relation 
to Decree-Law 298/92, 
31st December1992. 
No change in 
relation to Decree-
Law 298/92, 31st 
December 1992. 
No change in 
relation to Decree-




Table II - Mergers, Acquisitions and Entries in the Portuguese Commercial Banking Market.
                                                          
5
 Banco Português de Investimento (BPI) was created in 1984 but as an investment bank. The bank only started in the commercial banking activity when acquired Banco Fonsecas & Burnay, 










Merger, Acquisition or Entry in the Market 
 




Banco da Agricultura, Banco de Angola and Banco Pinto de Magalhães 
merge into União de Bancos Portugueses. 
1964 Banco Nacional Ultramarino acquires Banco Ferreira Alves & Pinto Leite. 1979 Banco Micaelense is transformed into Banco Comercial dos Açores. 
 
1966 
Banco Lisboa & Açores acquires Banco Português da Madeira. 
Banco Espírito Santo & Comercial de Lisboa acquires the banking house Blandy 
Brothers. 
1983 Privatizations – Decree-Law 406/83 of 19 November 
1984 Banco Português de Investimento
5
 is created. 
1986 Banco Comercial Português is created. 
 
1967 
Banco Fonsecas, Santos & Viana merges with Banco Burnay giving birth to 
Banco Fonsecas & Burnay. 
Banco Fonsecas & Burnay acquires Banco Regional de Aveiro. 
1988 Banco Internacional do Funchal is created by transformation of Caixa 
Económica do Funchal. 
1991 Banco Mello is created. 
1969 Banco Lisboa & Açores merges with Banco Totta-Aliança giving birth to Banco 
Totta & Açores 




Banco Intercontinental Português is created as a result of the merger of two 
banking houses, Casa Bancária Augustine Reis & Cª and Casa Bancária Souza 
Cruz & Cª. 
Banco Pinto de Magalhães is created by transformation of the banking house 
Pinto de Magalhães. 
1995 Banco Português de Investimento acquires Banco Fonsecas & Burnay. 
Santander Group acquires Banco Comércio e Indústria. 
1996 Banco Mello acquires União de Banco Portugueses. 
 
1998 
Banco Comercial Português acquires Banco Português do Atlântico. 
Banco Português de Investimento acquires Banco Borges & Irmão and 
Banco de Fomento e Exterior. 1975 Nationalizations – Decree-Law 132-A/75 of 14 March 
 
1976 
Banco Espírito Santo & Comercial de Lisboa merges with the banking house 
Manuel Mendes Godinho & Filho. 
Banco Fonsecas & Burnay merges with the banking house Pancada, Morais & 
Companhia. 
1999 Banco Comercial Português acquires Banco Mello. 
2000 Banco Comercial Português acquires Banco Pinto & Sotto Mayor. 




Crédito Predial Português merges with Banco Agrícola e Industrial Visiense. 
Banco Fonsecas & Burnay merges with Banco do Alentejo. 
Banco Português do Atlântico merges with Banco do Algarve. 
Banco Português do Atlântico merges with Banco Fernandes Magalhães. 
Banco Pinto & Sotto Mayor merges with Banco Intercontinental Português. 
2003 Banco Internacional do Funchal acquires Banco Comercial dos Açores 
2004 Banco Santander Portugal, Banco Totta & Açores and Crédito Predial 
Português merge, giving birth to Banco Santander Totta. 
2008 Banco Português de Negócios is nationalized and incorporated into Caixa 
Geral de Depósitos. 
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Table III – Descriptive Statistics 
 Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
IR/A: Interest revenue/Total assets 628 6.93 3.94 0.66 18.39 
TR/A: Total revenue/Total assets 628 8.56 4.63 2.27 20.49 
IR: Interest revenue 628 479.65 982.05 0.0096 8,052.37 
TR: Total revenue 628 667.81 1,435.99 0.0099 9,614.62 
WL: Wages/Total assets 628 1.29 0.46 0.36 3.17 
WK: Capital Expenditures/Fixed capital 628 161.12 192.83 5.02 1,823.01 
WF: Interest paid/Interest-bearing debt 628 86.17 117.91 0.61 1,584.12 
DD/TD: Demand Deposits/Total debt 628 41.32 21.30 0.15 98.86 
L/A: Loans/Total assets 628 51.49 14.24 14.21 83.34 
IB/L: Interbank deposits/Loans 628 25.29 35.69 0.12 308.82 
OBS/A: Off-balance sheet/Total assets 628 74.75 73.54 4.30 576.15 
A/B: Total assets/branches 628 2,098.44 3,067.86 13.52 28,866.30 
E/A: Equity/Total assets 628 7.27 6.89 0.10 75.56 
OR/IR: Other Revenue/Total revenue 628 18.96 11.76 2.32 77.94 
ROA: Net Income/Total Assets 628 0.55 0.92 -4.63 15.95 
NOTE: Money variables are valued in millions of 1999 Euros and ratios are defined in percentage form. 
 
Table IV - Results for H-statistic and competition tests in the 1960-2013 period, by taking into 






𝒍𝒏(𝑰𝑹 𝑨⁄ ) 
(3) 
 








𝑙𝑛𝑤𝐿 -0.001 (-0.69) 0.825 (20.45)* 0.805 (18.95)* 0.901 (9.20)* 0.881 (8.86)* 
𝑙𝑛𝑤𝐾  0.0004 (1.47) 0.004 (0.50) 0.003 (0.42) -0.024 (-1.32) -0.025 (-1.32) 
𝑙𝑛𝑤𝐹  -0.001 (-1.77)*** 0.067 (4.42)* 0.068 (4.22)* 0.053 (1.42) 0.053 (1.41) 
𝑙𝑛 (𝐷𝐷 𝑇𝐷)⁄  -0.001 (-1.10) -0.079 (-3.59)* -0.075 (-3.19)* -0.247 (-4.59)* -0.242 (-4.43)* 
𝑙𝑛 (𝐿 𝐴)⁄  -0.0001 (-0.07) -0.109 (-2.17)** -0.124 (-2.32)** 0.044 (0.36) 0.03 (0.24) 
𝑙𝑛(𝐼𝐵 𝐿)⁄  0.001 (2.26)** -0.005 (-0.38) -0.006 (-0.47) -0.062 (-2.01)** -0.063 (-2.02)** 
𝑙𝑛(𝑂𝐵𝑆 𝐴)⁄  -0.002 (-3.49)* -0.034 (-1.90)*** -0.048 (-2.53)** -0.094 (-2.17)** -0.108 (-2.45)** 
𝑙𝑛(𝐴 𝐵)⁄  -0.001 (3.28)* 0.072 (11.09)* 0.073 (10.67)* 1.267 (80.31)* 1.268 (79.14)* 
𝑙𝑛(𝐸 𝐴⁄ ) 0.002 (3.24)* -0.151 (-6.75)* -0.143 (-6.05)* -0.43 (-7.92)* -0.422 (-7.65)* 
𝑙𝑛⁡(𝑂𝑅 𝐼𝑅)⁄  -0.002 (-3.17)* -0.199 (-9.31)* 0.071 (3.15)* -0.046 (-0.88) 0.225 (4.26)* 
𝛼 0.013 (1.62) -1.104 (-4.56)* -0.478 (-1.88)*** -0.195 (-0.33) 0.43 (0.72) 
H-Statistic 
(𝜷𝟏 + 𝜷𝟐 + 𝜷𝟑) 
 0.896 0.877 0.929 0.909 
      
Equilibrium (p-value) 0.2601     
      
p-value (𝑯 ≤ 𝟎)  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
p-value (𝑯 = 𝟏)  0.0076 0.0027 0.4533 0.3454 
      
𝐑𝟐 0.3533 0.7238 0.6787 0.9184 0.9184 
N 593 628 628 628 628 
NOTE: The coefficients of each variable are presented in the table and t-statistics are represented in parentheses. 
*The variable is significant at 1% significance level. 
**The variable is significant at 5% significance level. 









𝒍𝒏(𝑫𝑫 𝑻𝑫⁄ ) 
 
𝒍𝒏(𝑳 𝑨⁄ ) 
 
𝒍𝒏(𝑰𝑩 𝑳⁄ ) 
 
𝒍𝒏(𝑶𝑩𝑺 𝑨⁄ ) 
 
𝒍𝒏(𝑨 𝑩⁄ ) 
 
𝒍𝒏(𝑬 𝑨⁄ ) 
 
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table V – Results for H-statistic and competition tests, shorts periods 
 
** The variable is significant at 1% significance level; **The variable is significant at 5% significance level; ***The variable is significant at 10% significance level. 
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Table VI – H-statistic and type of competition results, Portugal, various periods. 
Authors Period Focus Group H-Statistic Type of Competition 
Bikker and 
Groeneveld (2000) 
1989-1996 38 Portuguese 
banks 
0.73-0.76 Monopolistic Competition 
Bikker and Haaf 
(2002) 
1991-1998 41 Portuguese 
banks 
0.83 Monopolistic Competition 














































(with a scaled dependent 
variable). 
Perfect Competition (with 
a non-scale dependent 
variable). 
 
Table VII – Type of competition results, various countries, various periods.  
Authors Country/Region  Period Type of Competition 
Nathan and Neave (1989) Canada 1982-1984 Perfect Competition in 1982. 
Monopolistic Competition in 
1983 and 1984. 
Molyneux et al. (1994) France, Germany, 
Italy, Spain and UK 
1986-1989 Monopoly for Italy. 
Monopolistic Competition for 
France, Germany, Spain and UK. 
Vesala (1995) Finland 1985-1992 Monopolistic Competition 
Molyneux et al. (1996) Japan 1986-1988 Monopoly in 1986 
Monopolistic Competition in 
1988 
Bikker and Groeneveld (2000) 15 EU Countries 1989-1996 Monopolistic Competition 
De Bandt and Davis (2000) France, Germany 
and Italy 
1992-1996 Monopolistic Competition 
Bikker and Haaf (2002) 23 OECD countries 1988-1998 Monopolistic Competition 
Hempell (2002) Germany 1993-1998 Monopolistic Competition 
Claessens & Laeven (2004) 50 countries 1994-2001 Monopolistic Competition 
Coccorese (2005) Italy 1988-2000 Monopolistic Competition 
Macit (2012) Turkey 2005-2010 Monopolistic Competition 
 
